The following is an edited extract from a symposium held at a university in Durham, part of a series on ethics and the environment. The chair, Dr Helen Marsh, was joined by Owen Adeyemi, a moral philosopher; Clara Lindqvist, an economist who advises public bodies on long-term planning; and Ruth Pennington, a historian of ideas.
Helen Marsh: Let me begin with the obvious objection. Future people do not exist. How can we owe anything to someone who isn't there to be owed? Owen Adeyemi: It's a fair question, but I think it rests on a confusion. If I leave broken glass on a beach, and a child cuts her foot on it in twenty years' time, I have harmed her, even though she wasn't born when I dropped it. The harm doesn't need a contemporary victim. Distance in time, like distance in space, doesn't seem to me to dilute responsibility; it only makes it easier to ignore.
Helen Marsh: Clara, economists have a reputation for being rather less generous to the future. Clara Lindqvist: We have a reputation for discounting it, which is not quite the same thing. When governments weigh up a project, a flood defence, say, they usually treat costs and benefits that arrive later as worth somewhat less than those that arrive now. Part of that is sensible: future generations will probably be richer, and money now can be invested. But the rate we choose matters enormously. At a high rate, a catastrophe a century away barely registers on the balance sheet. I'd say discounting for uncertainty is defensible; discounting someone's wellbeing simply because they were born later is not.
Ruth Pennington: May I add a historical footnote? The idea isn't new. Edmund Burke, writing in the eighteenth century, described society as a partnership not only between those who are living, but between the living, the dead and those yet to be born. Burke is usually remembered as a conservative, and he meant that we should be careful about tearing down what our ancestors built. But the same thought can cut both ways. If we are trustees of an inheritance, we are obliged to hand it on in reasonable condition, and that applies to rivers and soils as much as to institutions.
Helen Marsh: Owen, there's a famous puzzle here, isn't there? Owen Adeyemi: There is: the non-identity problem, set out most memorably by the philosopher Derek Parfit. Which particular people will exist in the future depends on countless choices we make now, down to who meets whom and when. So if we choose a careless policy, the people born later may be different people from those who would have existed under a careful one. Can we say we've made them worse off, when the alternative was that they wouldn't exist at all? Most of us feel instinctively that the careless policy is still wrong. The difficulty is explaining why, and philosophers are still arguing about it.
Clara Lindqvist: Which is precisely why I'm wary of grand theories. In practice, institutions muddle through with something cruder. We don't know exactly who will live in 2100, but we know they'll need clean water and a stable climate. You don't have to solve the puzzle to keep the reservoir full. Ruth Pennington: Though I'd add a note of caution. Every generation has been tempted to imagine its descendants as people exactly like itself, only more numerous. Our great-grandparents could not have predicted what we would value. Humility suggests leaving options open rather than deciding on the future's behalf.
Helen Marsh: That sounds like an argument for doing less. Ruth Pennington: For foreclosing less. Doing nothing can close doors too: think of a species that, once lost, can never return. Owen Adeyemi: And there's a danger on the other side as well. If we take the vast number of possible future people seriously, it can seem to dwarf everything else, and that can be used to justify neglecting people who are suffering today. I don't think the future should become a trump card that wins every argument. It should be a voice at the table, not the only one.
Helen Marsh: A voice at the table. How might it actually be heard? Clara Lindqvist: Some countries have experimented with exactly that. Wales, for example, passed a law in 2015 requiring public bodies to consider the long-term effects of their decisions, and created a commissioner to speak for future generations. Whether such offices have real teeth is another matter, but they change the questions people ask in meetings, and that is not nothing. Helen Marsh: On that modestly hopeful note, let's take some questions from the floor.