The Unfinished Mind: In Praise of Doubt, by Clara Pemberton. 320 pages, £20.
There is a particular kind of book that every age seems to need and few writers manage to produce: a book that argues, with conviction, against too much conviction. Clara Pemberton, who taught philosophy for many years before turning to writing, has produced a spirited example. Her thesis is simple to state and hard to live by: doubt is not the enemy of knowledge but its engine, and a culture that treats uncertainty as weakness will end up knowing less, not more.
Pemberton begins, inevitably, with Socrates, who claimed to be wiser than his fellow Athenians only in one respect: he did not imagine he knew what he did not know. From there she moves briskly through the centuries. We meet Montaigne in his tower library, who had a medal struck bearing the question "What do I know?" and wrote his essays as a way of finding out. We meet Descartes, resolving to doubt everything that could possibly be doubted in order to discover what could not. And we meet Keats, who in a letter of 1817 praised "negative capability", the ability to remain "in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason".
These chapters are the book's great pleasure. Pemberton writes with an essayist's ear and a teacher's patience, and she has a gift for the detail that brings a figure to life. Her account of Descartes, who wrote his Meditations as if a single sceptical argument could be settled in six days, is both affectionate and quietly funny. Readers who know the material will find little that is new, but they will rarely find it so lucidly arranged.
The second half of the book is more ambitious and, it must be said, more uneven. Here Pemberton turns from the history of doubt to its practice. She argues that the scientific method is essentially organised doubt: a set of habits and institutions, from peer review to the replication of experiments, designed to catch our errors before they harden into dogma. She is good on the psychology of certainty, on how confident people are rewarded in meetings and on television, and on how admitting "I'm not sure" can feel like a professional risk. One chapter, on doctors who have learned to say "I don't know yet" to patients, is genuinely moving.
The difficulty is that doubt, like courage, is a virtue only in the right measure and in the right place. Pemberton knows this; she quotes the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, who warned in 1868 against pretending "to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts". Yet the book never quite builds the distinction into its argument. There is a world of difference between the scientist who doubts her own hypothesis and the campaign that manufactures doubt in order to delay action. Pemberton mentions, in passing, the notorious internal memo from a tobacco company in the late 1960s which declared that "doubt is our product". That sentence deserved a chapter of its own, for it shows that doubt can be used as a weapon by people who are themselves entirely certain of what they want.
What, then, distinguishes healthy doubt from its counterfeit? Pemberton's scattered remarks suggest an answer she might have made explicit. Genuine doubt is directed first at oneself; it is proportionate to the evidence; and it aims, eventually, at a conclusion, even a provisional one. Counterfeit doubt is aimed only at others, ignores the weight of evidence, and is content to leave a question open for ever because an open question serves its purpose. Montaigne's "What do I know?" is a question asked in good faith. "How can anyone be sure?" can be the same question, or its opposite.
None of this undermines the book's central achievement, which is to make intellectual humility seem not timid but brave. In one of her best passages, Pemberton recalls Oliver Cromwell's famous plea of 1650: "I beseech you … think it possible you may be mistaken." It is, she notes drily, advice that its author found much easier to give than to take. The same might be said of most of us. The Unfinished Mind will not cure its readers of certainty, but it may leave them a little more willing to think it possible they are mistaken, which is, perhaps, the most a book of this kind can hope for.