This is an edited transcript of an evening debate held in a marquee at a small philosophy festival in Ludlow. The chair, the broadcaster Ruth Okafor, was joined by Dr Tobias Wren, who teaches ethics at Durham, and Professor Anjali Mehta, a moral philosopher at Bristol. Some three hundred people braved the drizzle to attend.
Ruth: Let's begin with something deceptively simple. What actually happens when I make a promise? Tobias: Something rather extraordinary. By uttering a few words, I create an obligation that did not exist a moment before. The philosopher J. L. Austin called such sentences performatives: saying "I promise" is not describing an act; it is the act. Hume found this so puzzling that he called the obligation artificial. Promises, for him, are a human invention, like money, which works only because we all take part in the practice. Anjali: And I'd stress that second point. A promise is less like a magic spell than like a cheque. It has value because there is a whole edifice of trust standing behind it. Break enough promises and the currency loses its value for everyone.
Ruth: Which is presumably why Kant thought you must never make a false promise. Tobias: Exactly. Kant asked us to imagine everyone making promises they had no intention of keeping whenever it suited them. In such a world nobody would believe a promise, so the practice itself would collapse. The lying promiser is a free rider: he relies on a system of trust that his own conduct, if everyone copied it, would destroy. I find that argument as compelling now as when I first read it at nineteen. Anjali: It's a fine argument against lying promises. But most broken promises aren't lies. They're promises made in good faith that circumstances later make painful, or even wrong, to keep.
Ruth: Give us an example. Anjali: The one W. D. Ross used is still the best. I promise to meet a friend for lunch, and on the way I come across a road accident where I can help. Nobody thinks I should step over the injured person to be punctual. Ross's answer was that keeping promises is a prima facie duty: a genuine obligation, but one that can be outweighed by a weightier one. The duty doesn't vanish, which is why I still owe my friend an apology and an explanation. Tobias: I accept the case, of course. My worry is the slippery slope. Once we allow that a promise is merely one consideration among many, people begin to treat promises as provisional: I'll keep my word unless something more attractive comes along. A promise that bends to every breeze is not really a promise.
Ruth: What about promises that can never be checked? A promise made to someone who is dying, say. Tobias: Those seem to me the purest test. No one will ever know if I break it, and the person cannot be disappointed. If I still feel bound, and most people do, that suggests the obligation isn't simply about consequences. Anjali: The feeling is powerful, I agree, though I'd read it differently. But I've known families torn apart by deathbed promises that should never have been extracted: "Promise me you'll never sell the farm." Sometimes the most loving interpretation of a promise is not the most literal one.
Ruth: Can I make a promise to myself? Every January, millions of us try. Anjali: Philosophers have long been sceptical. If I am both the person who promises and the person who can release me from the promise, the obligation seems to evaporate the moment it becomes inconvenient. Tobias: Which may explain why New Year's resolutions have such a dismal record! Though I'd say the self who makes the resolution and the self who breaks it on the second of January are not on entirely equal terms.
Ruth: We're nearly out of time. Is there anything you agree on? Anjali: More than the audience might hope. We both think promises matter enormously, that they bind us in a way mere intentions don't, and that the first duty is to promise sparingly. Most broken promises were careless ones. Tobias: Nietzsche wrote of the long task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises. I've always liked that: it treats our capacity to commit our future selves as something hard-won, a sign of maturity rather than a burden. Where Anjali and I differ is on how often that right should yield to circumstance. Ruth: On that note of cordial disagreement, thank you both.