On the mantelpiece in my grandmother's flat in Whitby there is a photograph of a girl of about six, squinting into the sun on a beach in 1951. "That's me," my grandmother says, with the serene confidence of someone stating the obvious. Yet very little about the girl seems to survive in the woman of eighty-one. Her face has changed beyond recognition, and she does not remember the day itself at all. What, then, licenses that small, confident word "me"? Philosophers call this the problem of personal identity, and it is one of those questions that seem trivial until you try to answer them.
The most obvious answer is the body. I am the same person because I am the same living organism. This view has the merit of common sense, but it is less robust than it looks. The material of the body is constantly being replaced, at different rates in different tissues, so the organism resembles a river more than a statue: it keeps its shape while its contents flow through it. More troublingly, we can imagine cases in which body and person seem to come apart. If your memories and character were somehow transferred into another body, most of us feel that you would go with them, leaving behind an empty vessel.
This intuition was given its classic form by John Locke, who added a chapter on identity to the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1694. Locke imagined the soul of a prince, carrying the prince's memories, entering the body of a cobbler. The man who woke in the workshop, he argued, would be the prince. For Locke, a person extends exactly as far back as consciousness, and above all memory, can reach. The theory is elegant, and it explains why we hold people responsible for what they did rather than for what someone with their face did.
It also invites an objection, which the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid pressed with characteristic wit. Imagine, Reid said, a boy who is punished at school for stealing apples from an orchard. Years later, as a brave young officer, he remembers the punishment; later still, as an elderly general, he remembers his deeds as an officer but has completely forgotten the orchard. On Locke's account, the general is the officer and the officer is the boy, yet the general is not the boy. Identity cannot behave like that: if A is the same as B, and B is the same as C, then A must be the same as C. Locke's defenders have since refined the theory, using overlapping chains of psychological connection, but the episode is a reminder that intuitions which feel secure can lead to absurd conclusions.
David Hume went further and doubted whether there was a stable self to identify at all. Whenever he looked inwards, he reported, he never caught himself without a perception, of heat or cold, love or hatred, and never observed anything but the perceptions. The self, on this view, is a "bundle" of experiences, held together by resemblance and cause rather than by some underlying essence. Hume cheerfully confessed that such sceptical doubts tended to evaporate once he had dined and played backgammon with his friends.
In the twentieth century the debate was transformed by Derek Parfit, an Oxford philosopher with a gift for unsettling scenarios. In one, a teletransporter scans your body on Earth, destroys it and builds an exact replica on Mars. Is the person who steps out on Mars you, or a perfect copy who merely believes he is? Parfit's startling conclusion was that the question "Will it be me?" may have no determinate answer, and that this need not matter. What matters, he argued, is psychological continuity, the persistence of memories and character, and that can hold in degrees. Before he reached this view, Parfit wrote, his life had seemed like a glass tunnel, through which he was moving faster every year and at the end of which there was darkness. Afterwards, the walls of the tunnel disappeared; he now lived in the open air, less preoccupied with his own future and more concerned with the lives of others.
Not everyone finds this consoling. Some contemporary philosophers argue that we become persons by telling ourselves a coherent story, in which past episodes are reinterpreted and given a place. On this narrative view, identity is something we partly achieve rather than simply possess. Critics, among them the philosopher Galen Strawson, reply that some people live perfectly well without any sense of their life as a story, and that the theory confuses a person with an autobiography.
None of these theories quite dissolves my grandmother's confidence, and perhaps none should. When she points at the girl, she is not making a claim about souls or bundles; she is acknowledging a line of descent: the girl's fears and hopes gave way, through countless small changes, to the woman holding the frame. The puzzle of personal identity does not show that this line is an illusion. It shows that it is a thread rather than a chain, strong not because any single fibre runs its whole length, but because many fibres overlap. That image, as it happens, comes from Wittgenstein, who used it for a different purpose, but it serves this one well.