In 1890 two American lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, published an article in the Harvard Law Review that would become one of the most cited essays in legal history. Alarmed by new portable cameras and by newspapers that printed gossip about private lives, they argued for what they called 'the right to be let alone'. The technology that troubled them now seems almost quaint. Yet the question they asked has only grown more pressing: what part of a person's life should others be entitled to see?
Since then, privacy has acquired the dignity of formal law. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to respect for private and family life, and in 2018 the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation gave people new powers over information held about them. On paper, privacy has rarely been better protected. In practice, many of us surrender more of it before breakfast than our great-grandparents did in a lifetime.
The most familiar argument against worrying is simple: if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear. It is a seductive line, and it is worth taking seriously before taking it apart. Its first weakness is that it treats privacy as a refuge for wrongdoing. But we close the bathroom door, keep diaries and speak quietly to friends in cafés not because we are guilty but because some parts of life are not meant for an audience. A person who has nothing to hide still draws the curtains.
Its second weakness is subtler. The argument assumes that we know, now, what information about us might be used, by whom and for what purpose. We do not. A list of the books someone has borrowed, harmless in one decade, may be incriminating in another; a pattern of movements that seems meaningless alone can, when combined with thousands of others, reveal startlingly intimate facts – where someone worships, whom they love, when they are ill. Information, unlike a spoken remark, does not fade. It accumulates, and it can be repurposed.
The philosopher Jeremy Bentham, writing in the late eighteenth century, designed a prison he called the Panopticon, in which a single guard could observe every cell without the prisoners knowing whether they were being watched at any given moment. The genius of the design, as later critics noted, was that the guard hardly needed to be there: prisoners who might be watched at any moment began to watch themselves. The point is not that our societies are prisons – that would be melodramatic – but that observation changes behaviour even when nothing is done with what is observed. People who suspect they are being monitored tend to read less widely, speak less freely and experiment less with ideas. Privacy, on this account, is not a luxury for the secretive but a condition of a free mind.
There is a further twist. We usually speak of privacy as an individual possession, something each of us may keep or trade away. Yet much personal information is inherently shared. A photograph of a party includes the guests; a message reveals both sender and recipient; a genetic test taken by one person discloses information about their parents, brothers, sisters and cousins, none of whom were asked. When one person waives their privacy, they often waive a little of other people's too. This is why consent, important as it is, cannot carry the whole weight of protection. Clicking 'I agree' on terms that almost nobody reads is a flimsy foundation for a right.
What follows from this? Not, I think, a nostalgic rejection of technology. Shared calendars, medical records available to any doctor who needs them and maps that guide us through unfamiliar cities make life better in ways that would have astonished Warren and Brandeis. The question is not whether information should flow but on what terms. Rules that limit how long data may be kept, that stop it being used for purposes other than those for which it was collected, and that place the burden of care on the organisations holding it rather than on the individual who clicked a button, all treat privacy as a shared safeguard rather than a private eccentricity.
Brandeis later became a justice of the United States Supreme Court, and in a famous opinion of 1928 he described the right to be let alone as the right most valued by civilised people. We might add a modern corollary. To be let alone is not to be isolated; it is to be given room – room to think, to change our minds, to become someone other than the sum of our recorded past. A society that protects that room is not hiding from the future. It is making sure the future still has space for people to grow.