Every nation, it seems, needs a cradle. Rome had its twins, Romulus and Remus, set adrift on the Tiber and nursed by a she-wolf; medieval Britain, if Geoffrey of Monmouth is to be believed, was founded by Brutus, a wandering descendant of the Trojan hero Aeneas; the Swiss have William Tell and his crossbow. Few historians now treat such stories as literal chronicle, and yet they survive with a tenacity that mere facts rarely achieve. Anselm Pryce's elegant new study, 'The Borrowed Cradle', sets out to ask why.
Pryce's answer, stated early and pursued with patience, is that origin myths are not failed attempts at history but successful attempts at something else. They are, in his phrase, 'charters of belonging': stories that tell a community not where it came from but who it wishes to be. The Romans who traced their ancestry to Aeneas, a refugee from fallen Troy, were not confused about dates; they were claiming a place in a grander and older story than their own, one that Virgil would give its most famous form in the 'Aeneid'.
Geoffrey's 'History of the Kings of Britain', written in the twelfth century, is a case in point. Even some of his contemporaries were sceptical, and modern scholars regard much of it as invention. But the book was hugely popular, copied and adapted for centuries, and it gave the island a pedigree to rival Rome's. Pryce is especially good on the way such stories are retrofitted: each age reshapes the myth to suit its own anxieties, so that the founding hero becomes, by turns, a pious king, a model of chivalry or a symbol of resistance to foreign rule.
The book's intellectual lodestar is Ernest Renan, the nineteenth-century French scholar who argued in a celebrated lecture of 1882 that forgetting, 'and I would even say historical error', is an essential factor in the making of a nation. Renan's point was not cynical. A nation, he suggested, is held together by a shared past and a present wish to live together, and the shared past is always partly curated: certain episodes are polished, others quietly left in the dark. Pryce extends the argument with the help of Benedict Anderson's idea of the nation as an 'imagined community', made up of people who will never meet but who share the same stories.
Here the book is at its most persuasive and, occasionally, its most evasive. Pryce is admirably even-handed. He resists the fashionable pleasure of debunking, the sport of exposing each beloved legend as a fraud and then congratulating oneself on one's own clear sight. Myths, he insists, do real work: they console, they bind, they inspire acts of generosity as well as suspicion. Yet he is less forthcoming about the other side of that coin. A story that defines who belongs also defines, by implication, who does not, and a myth of common descent can make newcomers feel like permanent guests. Pryce acknowledges this in a single chapter, but one senses he would rather be telling stories than adjudicating them.
Perhaps that is forgivable. The alternative, a strict and joyless literalism that would strip every nation of its legends, has never been tried with much success, and it is not obvious that it would leave us any wiser. People do not abandon stories because they are shown to be untrue; they abandon them when better stories come along. The more promising path, which Pryce gestures towards in his final pages, is to hold origin myths at a slight distance: to tell them, to enjoy them, and to know them for what they are.
There is a lovely moment near the end when Pryce describes watching a group of schoolchildren in Altdorf, the Swiss town most closely associated with Tell, being told the legend by a guide who added, with a smile, that it may never have happened. 'Then why do we tell it?' asked one child. 'Because,' said the guide, 'it tells us what we would like to have done.' It is as good a definition of a national myth as any, and a fitting coda to a book that is wiser than most about the porous border between what happened and what we need to have happened.