There is a particular kind of argument about empires that never seems to end, because it is conducted as though history were a set of accounts. On one side of the ledger sit the roads, the railways, the written laws and the shared languages; on the other, conquest, extraction and the slow humiliation of peoples governed by strangers. Each side adds up its columns, announces a total and accuses the other of bad arithmetic. I want to suggest that the ledger itself is the problem: that legacies are not credits and debits but something closer to an inheritance of tangled roots, impossible to separate without killing the tree.
Consider Rome, the empire against which all others in the European imagination have been measured. Its roads still lie beneath modern routes in many places; its law shaped legal systems across a continent; its language survives, transformed, in French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Romanian. Yet the same roads that carried merchants also carried legions, and the Latin that became the lingua franca of European scholars for a thousand years first spread because Roman armies had conquered people who spoke something else. To admire the aqueduct without asking whose labour built it is naive; to refuse to admire it at all is a different kind of blindness.
The Mongol Empire offers an even starker illustration. Within a few decades of its founding in the early thirteenth century, it had become the largest contiguous land empire in history, stretching at its height from Korea to Eastern Europe. Its campaigns caused enormous suffering, and no serious historian would wish to soften that. And yet, once established, Mongol rule made the overland trade routes linking China to the Mediterranean safer than they had been for centuries, a period sometimes called the Pax Mongolica. Goods, techniques and ideas travelled further and faster. It is a disquieting thought that one of history's great ages of exchange was built on conquest, but disquiet is not a reason to look away.
Closer to home, the British Empire left behind parliaments and railways, cricket grounds and courtrooms, and above all a language that now belongs to far more people outside Britain than within it. English is used today as a first, second or working language by well over a billion people, many of whom have made it thoroughly their own, bending it into new rhythms and new literatures. Is this a legacy of empire? Plainly, in part. But to describe it as a gift is to forget that it was rarely offered; it was frequently imposed, and its later flowering owes as much to the people who appropriated it as to those who brought it.
Two temptations, then, haunt the subject. The first is nostalgia: the habit of recalling empire as a pageant of explorers and engineers, in which the governed appear, if at all, as grateful spectators. The second is what might be called pure indictment, in which every bridge becomes evidence for the prosecution and the people of the past are reduced to villains and victims. Both are comfortable. Both spare us the labour of holding two true things in mind at once, and both, curiously, turn the colonised into bit players in someone else's story, whether as beneficiaries or as casualties.
The more interesting work of recent decades has tried to escape this binary. Historians have asked how people living under imperial rule negotiated, resisted, adapted and borrowed; how local elites sometimes cooperated for reasons of their own; how ideas travelled in both directions along the routes of power. The picture that emerges is less tidy and more human. Empire appears not as a machine imposed on passive societies but as an arena in which many actors pursued their own ends, often unequally matched and rarely without consequence.
None of this amounts to an exoneration. Inequality of power was the defining feature of every empire, and it is no defence of a structure to point out that people found ways to live within it. But it does change the question we ask. Rather than 'Was empire good or bad?', a question that invites a verdict and closes the conversation, we might ask 'What, precisely, did this empire leave behind, for whom, and at what cost?' That question has no single answer, which is exactly why it is worth asking.
We do not choose our inheritances. The borders, languages, institutions and grievances that empires bequeathed are simply there, as fixed as the old Roman stones beneath a modern road. What we can choose is how we hold them: with the squeamishness of those who would rather not look, the pride of those who see only the stones, or the patient curiosity of those who want to know who laid them, and why, and what it cost. Only the last, I think, deserves to be called history.