On a grey morning at a marine laboratory on the Devon coast, an octopus called Pebble is solving a puzzle. A crab has been sealed inside a clear jar with a screw-top lid, and Pebble, after a few seconds of what looks unmistakably like scrutiny, wraps three arms around the jar and begins to turn. 'She's quicker than last week,' says Dr Leah Fairbairn, who has studied octopus behaviour for fifteen years. 'And she's started doing it with a different arm. You can draw your own conclusions about that, but I find it hard not to.'
Questions about animal minds were once considered faintly disreputable among scientists. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant view held that talk of animal thoughts or feelings was unscientific anthropomorphism: the error of projecting human qualities onto creatures that could not report on their inner lives. Behaviour could be measured; experience could not. Better, the argument ran, to say nothing at all.
That caution has steadily given way. Chimpanzees use tools and pass on techniques to their young; crows can solve problems that require several steps; elephants appear to respond with distress to the bones of their dead. Some apes, dolphins, elephants and magpies seem to recognise themselves in a mirror. In 2012 a group of prominent neuroscientists signed the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, stating that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. More recently, experiments have suggested that bumblebees will roll small balls around apparently for no reward at all, behaviour that some researchers cautiously describe as play.
None of this settles the hardest question, which philosophers call the problem of other minds. I cannot directly feel your pain any more than I can feel Pebble's; in both cases I infer it from behaviour, anatomy and analogy with myself. With other humans, the inference is so strong that we rarely notice making it. With an octopus, whose last common ancestor with us lived hundreds of millions of years ago, and two thirds of whose neurons are in its arms, the analogy is stretched to breaking point. 'It's the closest we'll come to meeting an alien,' Dr Fairbairn says. 'And that's exactly why it's so interesting.'
Why should any of this matter morally? The philosopher Jeremy Bentham gave the classic answer in 1789. The question, he wrote, is not whether animals can reason or talk, but whether they can suffer. On this view, what grants a being moral status, the standing to have its interests taken into account, is not intelligence but sentience, the capacity to have experiences that feel good or bad from the inside. A clever animal that felt nothing would, strangely, matter less than a simple one that could feel pain.
Not everyone accepts Bentham's framing. Some philosophers argue that full moral status depends on capacities such as reasoning about the future or understanding duties, which would place most animals in a separate, though still protected, category. Others worry about the practical ramifications: if insects are sentient, the scale of our moral responsibilities becomes daunting, given the vast numbers affected by farming, building and simply driving a car on a summer evening. Even sympathetic scientists warn against leaping from intriguing behaviour to confident claims. 'Play-like is not the same as play,' one biologist told me. 'We should be humble in both directions.'
Law has begun, tentatively, to respond. The United Kingdom's Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act of 2022 formally recognised animals with a backbone as sentient beings and, following a government-commissioned review of the evidence, extended that recognition to octopuses, squid, crabs and lobsters. The Act does not ban anything by itself; it creates a committee to check whether new government policies take animal welfare into account. Critics on one side call it toothless; critics on the other fear it may complicate fishing and research. Supporters reply that its significance is symbolic as much as practical: it puts sentience, rather than mere usefulness, at the centre of the conversation.
Back at the laboratory, Pebble has finished her crab and is ensconced in a corner of her tank, one eye following the visitors. Dr Fairbairn is careful not to overstate what she knows. 'I can't tell you what it's like to be her,' she says. 'But the default has changed. It used to be that you had to prove an animal had feelings. Now I think we should be fairly confident that it doesn't before we treat it as if it were a machine.' It is a modest claim, but it reverberates far beyond one tank in Devon.