Imagine a stretch of open pasture shared by a village. Every family is free to graze its cows there. Each farmer, acting in their own interest, reasons that adding one more cow will bring them the full benefit of an extra animal, while the cost, slightly less grass for everyone, is shared among all. Since every farmer reasons in the same way, cows are added until the pasture is overgrazed and ruined. This, in essence, is the 'tragedy of the commons'.
The idea is older than its famous name. In the 1830s the British economist William Forster Lloyd used the example of cattle on common land to explain why shared resources tend to be overused. It was the American ecologist Garrett Hardin, however, who made the phrase famous in an influential essay published in 1968. Hardin argued that when a resource is open to all, individual self-interest leads inexorably to collective ruin: 'Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.' His proposed remedies were stark: either the resource should be divided up as private property, or it should be controlled by a powerful government.
The parable has proved remarkably durable, not least because it seems to explain so much. Overfishing in the open ocean, the clearing of forests, polluted rivers and, on the largest scale of all, a warming climate can all be understood as problems of the commons. The atmosphere belongs to nobody, so each country, company or individual has little incentive to limit emissions: the benefits of doing so are shared by everyone, while the costs fall on them alone. Economists call those who enjoy the benefits without paying the costs free riders.
Yet Hardin's account has been challenged, most notably by the political economist Elinor Ostrom, who in 2009 became the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in economics. Rather than relying on theory alone, Ostrom and her colleagues studied real communities around the world: farmers sharing irrigation channels in Spain and Nepal, villagers managing forests in Japan, herders on Swiss mountain pastures and lobster fishermen off the coast of Maine. Many of these communities had looked after their shared resources successfully for generations, sometimes for centuries, without either privatisation or heavy-handed state control.
What, then, made these communities succeed? Ostrom identified a set of common features, which she called design principles. The boundaries of the resource, and of the group entitled to use it, were clearly defined. The rules suited local conditions, and the people affected by them had a say in making and changing them. Use of the resource was monitored, often by the users themselves, and those who broke the rules faced sanctions that started small and grew stricter for repeated offences. Crucially, there were cheap and accessible ways of settling disputes. Trust, communication and a sense of shared responsibility, in short, could achieve what Hardin had assumed was impossible.
It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that Hardin was simply wrong. What Ostrom showed was that his tragedy is a possibility, not an inevitability. Problems arise above all when a resource is open to anyone, when users do not know or trust one another, and when there is no way of agreeing on or enforcing rules. These are precisely the conditions found in many global problems. Fish in international waters and the Earth's atmosphere are shared by billions of people who will never meet, which makes cooperation far harder than in a mountain village.
Even so, Ostrom's work offers grounds for cautious optimism. She argued against waiting for a single global solution and in favour of action at many levels at once, from local councils and cities to national governments and international agreements. Seen in this light, the tragedy of the commons is less a law of nature than a warning: shared resources can be squandered, but they can also be protected, provided that people are given the means and the reasons to cooperate.