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C2 Text 1 · Essay · 847 words

What Is Free Will?

A reflective essay on the ancient question of whether we are truly free, setting out the main philosophical positions and asking what the brain sciences can and cannot tell us.

Few questions are as old, or as stubbornly resistant to resolution, as whether we are genuinely free. In daily life we behave as though we were: we deliberate over menus, agonise over careers, thank a friend for her generosity and resent a stranger's rudeness. Yet the moment we try to say what this freedom consists in, it seems to slip through our fingers. Nor is the puzzle an idle one. Our habits of praise and blame, our courts and much of our private sense of who we are rest on the presupposition that, at least sometimes, we could have done otherwise.

The challenge comes most famously from determinism: the view that every event, including every human decision, is the inevitable result of what came before it, together with the laws of nature. If the state of the universe a thousand years ago, plus those laws, fixed everything that would follow, then my choice of tea over coffee this morning was settled long before I was born. The feeling that I might have chosen differently would be just that – a feeling, sincere but mistaken. On this picture we resemble actors who believe they are improvising while reciting, word for word, a script written by physics.

Philosophers have responded in roughly three ways. Hard determinists accept the argument and conclude that free will, in any sense worth having, is an illusion; some go on to argue that punishment should be redesigned around protection and rehabilitation rather than retribution. Libertarians – the term has nothing to do with politics here – insist that we are free and that determinism must therefore be false, at least where human choices are concerned. Their difficulty is to explain how an undetermined choice would be any more ours. If my decision is not caused by my beliefs, desires and character, it begins to look less like an exercise of freedom than a roll of the dice.

The third and most popular response, compatibilism, denies that we were ever forced to choose. David Hume, writing in the eighteenth century, argued that liberty is not the absence of causes but the absence of constraint. I act freely when I do what I want, for reasons I recognise as my own, and no one is forcing my hand. A person who signs a document because she has been coerced into it is unfree; a person who gives money to charity because she cares about others is free, even if her caring has a causal history stretching back through upbringing, temperament and genes. What matters, compatibilists say, is not where our desires come from but whether they flow through us in the right way.

Critics have never quite forgiven compatibilism for what they regard as a sleight of hand. Immanuel Kant dismissed it as a 'wretched subterfuge', a way of keeping the word 'freedom' while quietly abandoning the thing. If my wants were themselves fixed by forces I never chose, the critic asks, in what sense is acting on them an achievement of mine? Compatibilists reply that this demand – to be the ultimate author of oneself, all the way down – is not merely unmet but incoherent. No conceivable being could satisfy it, so it cannot be the standard by which ordinary freedom is judged.

Science has added fresh fuel to the debate. In the 1980s the American physiologist Benjamin Libet recorded a build-up of electrical activity in the brain, known as the readiness potential, that appeared to begin a fraction of a second before volunteers reported deciding to move a finger. Some commentators took this as proof that the brain 'decides' before we do. Later researchers have been more cautious, pointing out that flicking a finger at a random moment is hardly a model of a weighty decision, and that the signal may reflect a general state of readiness rather than a choice already made. The experiments are fascinating; whether they bear on free will at all remains fiercely contested.

When I put the question to Dr Miriam Okafor, who teaches philosophy of mind in Durham, she laughed at the idea that a laboratory could settle it. 'Neuroscience can tell us a great deal about how decisions are made,' she said. 'What it can't tell us, on its own, is which of those mechanisms deserve the name "freedom". That is a conceptual question, and it is ours to answer.'

Perhaps that is the most useful lesson. The free-will debate is less a contest between science and superstition than a dispute about what we were hoping for in the first place. If we wanted to stand outside the causal order altogether, like a small god issuing commands to the body, we are probably destined for disappointment. If we wanted something more modest – the capacity to weigh reasons, to respond to criticism, to change our minds and become, over time, somewhat different people – then there is a good deal of it about. Whether that more modest freedom is enough to underwrite our deepest moral attitudes is the question each generation has to reopen for itself.

Words in colour are explained in the glossary below.

Glossary

WordMeaning
deliberate/dɪˈlɪbəreɪt/to think carefully about something before deciding
idle/ˈaɪdl/(of a question) not serious and without practical results
presupposition/ˌpriːsʌpəˈzɪʃən/an idea that people accept as true without questioning it, and that other ideas depend on
determinism/dɪˈtɜːmɪnɪzəm/the belief that everything that happens, including what people do, is fixed by earlier causes
retribution/ˌretrɪˈbjuːʃən/punishment that someone is given because they are thought to deserve it
Libertarians/ˌlɪbəˈteəriənz/(in philosophy) people who believe that our choices are free because they are not fixed by earlier causes
undetermined/ˌʌndɪˈtɜːmɪnd/not fixed or caused in advance by anything that came before
compatibilism/kəmˈpætəbəlɪzəm/the view that people can be free even if everything they do has causes
constraint/kənˈstreɪnt/something that limits or controls what you can do
coerced/kəʊˈɜːst/forced to do something by threats or pressure
sleight of hand/ˌslaɪt əv ˈhænd/a clever trick that hides what is really happening
subterfuge/ˈsʌbtəfjuːdʒ/a dishonest trick used to avoid a problem or to hide the truth
incoherent/ˌɪnkəʊˈhɪərənt/not making sense, because the parts of an idea do not fit together
readiness potential/ˈredinəs pəˌtenʃəl/a slow build-up of electrical activity in the brain that comes before a movement
contested/kənˈtestɪd/argued about, because people strongly disagree
underwrite/ˌʌndəˈraɪt/to support something and give it a firm base

What Is Free Will?: tests

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