There is something disarmingly simple about utilitarianism. Stripped to its essentials, it holds that the right action is the one that produces the best overall consequences, usually understood as the greatest balance of happiness over suffering, with everyone's happiness counting equally. Jeremy Bentham, who gave the theory its classic form at the end of the eighteenth century, hoped to turn ethics into something like a science: a matter of measuring pleasures and pains rather than consulting tradition, privilege or sentiment. It is hard to overstate how radical this was. In Bentham's hands the principle became a weapon against laws that caused needless misery, and he applied it to causes far ahead of their time, from the reform of prisons to the welfare of animals. 'The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?'
John Stuart Mill, who was raised on Bentham's ideas, refined them in his short book Utilitarianism, published in 1863. Stung by the charge that the theory was a 'doctrine worthy only of swine', Mill distinguished between higher and lower pleasures, arguing that anyone who had experienced both would prefer the pleasures of the intellect and the imagination to mere physical gratification. 'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied,' he wrote; 'better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.' Critics have pointed out, with some justice, that the distinction sits awkwardly with the theory's egalitarian spirit, and that it seems to smuggle in a judgement of quality that pure arithmetic cannot supply.
The deeper discontents, however, concern not what is counted but the act of counting itself. Because utilitarianism cares only about totals, it seems indifferent to how happiness and suffering are shared out. Imagine a policy that makes a large majority slightly better off while making a small minority considerably worse off. If the sums come out in its favour, the theory appears to recommend it, however unfair it may feel to those who bear the cost. John Rawls famously complained that utilitarianism 'does not take seriously the distinction between persons'. People, on this view, are not merely containers of well-being, to be topped up or drained in the interests of the total, but individuals with rights that cannot simply be traded away.
A second worry is that the theory asks too much. The philosopher Peter Singer has argued that if you would wade into a shallow pond to save a drowning child, ruining your clothes, you have equally strong reason to give money that could save a child's life far away. Followed consistently, this reasoning seems to leave little room for the ordinary projects – hobbies, holidays, a slightly nicer flat – that make up most of a decent life. Singer himself accepts much of this conclusion and has done a great deal to encourage generous giving. Others treat the demand as a sign that something has gone wrong. Bernard Williams objected that utilitarianism alienates us from our own deepest commitments: it treats our loves and convictions as one more input to a calculation, when they are, in a sense, what makes us who we are.
Then there is the question of what happiness is. In 1974 Robert Nozick invited readers to imagine an 'experience machine' that could give them any experiences they wished – writing a great novel, making a friend, climbing a mountain – while they floated in a tank, their brains suitably stimulated. Most people, asked whether they would plug in for life, say no. If pleasure were all that mattered, the refusal would be irrational. Its near-universality suggests that we value not only feeling that we have achieved things but actually achieving them.
Utilitarians have not been short of replies. Rule utilitarians argue that we should follow the rules whose general acceptance would produce the best results; since a society that protected individual rights would be happier than one that did not, rights re-enter by the back door. Others bite the bullet, accepting counter-intuitive conclusions on the grounds that our intuitions are often products of habit and prejudice – the very things Bentham set out to challenge. And it is worth remembering how many moral advances began as utilitarian arguments against comfortable custom.
Dr Fiona Garside, who lectures in ethics at a university in Cardiff, puts the matter neatly. 'Almost no one is a pure utilitarian,' she told me, 'but almost no one can do without utilitarian thinking either. When a health service decides how to spend a limited budget, it has to weigh benefits against costs. The mistake is to think that this is the whole of morality rather than an indispensable part of it.'
Perhaps that is the fairest verdict. Utilitarianism is less a complete map of the moral world than a powerful lens, bringing certain features – suffering, scale, consequence – into sharp focus while blurring others. Its discontents are real, but so is its achievement: it taught us to ask, of any law or custom, whom it actually helps and whom it harms. That question has lost none of its bite.