Eenglish-tests.com

C2 Text 35 · Debate · 779 words

The Paradox of Tolerance

At a student debating society, three speakers argue about how far a tolerant society should tolerate the intolerant, drawing on Karl Popper and John Rawls.

The following is an edited record of a debate held at the Hartley Society, a student debating club in York. The motion was 'This house believes that a tolerant society must refuse to tolerate the intolerant.' The chair was Owen Pritchard; the speakers were Dr Nadia Selim, a philosopher; Callum Reid, a law student; and Ingrid Halvorsen, a visiting writer from Norway.

Owen: Nadia, you're proposing the motion. Where does the paradox come from? Nadia: From Karl Popper, who stated it in 1945 in 'The Open Society and Its Enemies'. His point was that unlimited tolerance may lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend it without limit even to those who are themselves intolerant – who would abolish the freedoms of others the moment they had the power – then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. A society that cannot defend its own foundations is not admirably open; it is simply defenceless.

Callum: Can I point out what Popper actually said next? Because the slogan version leaves it out. He was quite clear that he did not mean we should always suppress intolerant ideas. As long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check through public opinion, he thought suppression would be most unwise. The right to suppress, which he did claim, applied to movements that refuse to argue at all and answer argument with violence. That is a very high threshold, and it is not the one people usually have in mind when they quote him. Nadia: I accept that. I'm defending Popper, not his paraphrasers.

Ingrid: Then let me bring in a second voice. John Rawls, in 'A Theory of Justice', took up the same question in 1971. His answer was that the intolerant have little ground to complain if they are not tolerated, but that this does not by itself give the tolerant the right to silence them. Restriction, on his view, is justified only when the tolerant sincerely believe that their own security, and that of free institutions, is genuinely in danger. Otherwise a just society should put up with the intolerant, partly in the hope that the experience of living under free institutions will gradually win them over.

Owen: So both philosophers set the bar high. Why, then, is the motion controversial? Callum: Because the real argument is over who decides what counts as intolerant. Every censor in history has believed they were protecting society from dangerous ideas. Give any authority the power to silence 'the intolerant', and you have to ask what happens when that power passes to someone whose definition you don't share. The principle is only as safe as its least careful user. Nadia: But that argument proves too much. Every power can be abused, including the power of a court to imprison a thief. We don't abolish courts; we build safeguards – clear laws, independent judges, rights of appeal.

Ingrid: I want to reframe this slightly. We tend to talk as though tolerance were a single switch: on or off, speak or be silenced. In practice, societies have a whole range of responses short of a ban. You can refuse someone a platform at your own event without demanding that they be silenced everywhere. You can argue back, mock gently, ignore, or simply decline to invite them again. Much of what passes for a debate about censorship is really a debate about hospitality – who we choose to give our microphone to. Callum: That's a helpful distinction, but private hospitality can become public exclusion when enough people close ranks.

Owen: Is there any common ground? Nadia: I think so. None of us thinks tolerance means approving of everything. Tolerance is, by definition, putting up with what you dislike – otherwise it would just be agreement. Ingrid: And none of us thinks the intolerant forfeit their rights merely by holding an opinion. The line, if there is one, falls at action: at threats, intimidation and attempts to stop others from speaking. Callum: Where we differ is on how much trust to place in whoever draws that line. I remain more wary than Nadia. I'd rather err on the side of too much speech than too little. Nadia: And I'd rather live in a society that knows what it stands for. But I'll concede this: the paradox is a warning, not a licence.

When the vote was taken, the motion was narrowly defeated, by 61 votes to 54, with a number of abstentions. Several students said afterwards that they had arrived certain and left less so – which, the chair remarked, is perhaps the most a debating society can hope to achieve.

Words in colour are explained in the glossary below.

Glossary

WordMeaning
motion/ˈməʊʃən/the statement that is argued for and against in a formal debate
defenceless/dɪˈfensləs/unable to protect itself
threshold/ˈθreʃhəʊld/the level that must be reached before something happens
paraphrasers/ˈpærəfreɪzəz/people who repeat someone's ideas in their own, different words
put up with/ˌpʊt ˈʌp wɪð/accept something you do not like
censor/ˈsensə/a person who decides what may or may not be said, shown or published
proves too much/ˌpruːvz tuː ˈmʌtʃ/if it were true, it would also rule out things we clearly want to keep
safeguards/ˈseɪfɡɑːdz/rules or systems that protect against harm or misuse
reframe/ˌriːˈfreɪm/present a question in a different way
platform/ˈplætfɔːm/a chance to speak to an audience
hospitality/ˌhɒspɪˈtæləti/the way you welcome and treat guests
close ranks/ˌkləʊz ˈræŋks/stand together as a group, often to keep others out
forfeit/ˈfɔːfɪt/lose something as a result of what you have done
err on the side of/ˌɜːr ɒn ðə ˈsaɪd əv/choose to risk too much of one thing rather than too little
licence/ˈlaɪsns/permission to do something
narrowly/ˈnærəʊli/by only a small difference
abstentions/əbˈstenʃənz/cases when people choose not to vote either for or against

The Paradox of Tolerance: tests

Found this text useful? Share it with a friend or your class.