‘There’s no accounting for taste,’ the saying goes, and in everyday life we mostly agree. One person loves jazz, another cannot bear it; one collects porcelain, another finds it fussy. Taste, on this view, is the most private thing about us, as personal as a fingerprint. Yet a moment’s reflection suggests otherwise. If taste were truly random, it would not cluster so neatly. Why do people who share a postcode, a school or an income so often share a preference for the same newspapers, holidays and kitchen worktops?
Philosophers of the eighteenth century took the question seriously. The Scottish thinker David Hume, in his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (1757), argued that although beauty is not a property of objects in the way that weight is, some judgements are nonetheless better than others. A true judge, he suggested, combines delicate perception with practice, comparison and freedom from prejudice. Such critics are rare, but their shared verdict is the nearest thing we have to a standard. A generation later, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant claimed that when we call something beautiful, we speak as if everyone ought to agree, even though we cannot prove it. Both men, in their different ways, hoped to rescue taste from mere whim.
In 1979 the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu published Distinction, a vast study based on surveys of French households, and gave the debate an uncomfortable twist. Taste, he argued, is neither natural nor innocent. It is learned, largely at home and at school, and it works as a kind of currency, which he called cultural capital. Knowing how to talk about an opera or a wine, which cutlery to use, which jokes not to make: these competences open doors, and those who lack them can feel quietly shut out. Most strikingly, Bourdieu suggested that taste ‘classifies the classifier’. When we judge a painting or a sofa, we reveal at least as much about ourselves as about the object.
The theory has been widely criticised as well as admired. Some argue that it fits mid-century France better than other places and periods. Others point out that it leaves too little room for genuine aesthetic experience: a teenager moved to tears by a piece of music is not, surely, merely jockeying for social position. And from the 1990s onwards, American sociologists observed a shift that complicated the picture. Rather than snubbing popular culture, many well-educated people had become ‘omnivores’, happily mixing opera with hip-hop and fine dining with street food.
Yet this new openness, some critics argue, may be distinction in disguise. ‘It isn’t that the hierarchy has disappeared,’ says Dr Priya Sandhu, a cultural historian at a university in Leicester. ‘It’s that the rules have become more subtle. Liking everything is fine, as long as you like it in the right way, with the right ironic distance, and can explain why. That takes exactly the kind of education Bourdieu was describing.’ The snob who once sneered at a pop song now writes an appreciative essay about it, and the essay itself becomes a badge.
What, then, should we do with this knowledge? It would be a mistake to conclude that all taste is mere snobbery, or that no judgement is better than any other. Hume’s point still stands: practice and attention genuinely sharpen perception, and anyone who has learned to hear the inner voices of a string quartet, or to enjoy a difficult novel, knows that the pleasure is real, not a performance. The lesson of Bourdieu is not that taste is fake, but that the chance to develop it is unevenly shared, and that its uses are not always kind. Access to music lessons, galleries and libraries still depends heavily on circumstance.
Perhaps the most useful response is a kind of double awareness. We can enjoy our preferences wholeheartedly while holding them a little more lightly, remembering how much of them we inherited. And we can resist the temptation to treat other people’s pleasures as evidence of their inferiority. A society that wants to share its culture widely might begin by making the doors easier to open, rather than by policing who walks through them. There may, after all, be no accounting for taste; but there is certainly an account to be given of how we come by it, and that account is worth knowing.