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C2 Text 22 · Symposium · 704 words

Consciousness: The Hard Problem

An edited transcript of a public symposium in which a neuroscientist and a philosopher debate whether science can ever explain conscious experience.

The following is an edited transcript of a symposium held at a festival of ideas in Durham. The chair, Professor Ruth Okafor, was joined by the neuroscientist Dr Tom Haverford and the philosopher Dr Ines Valera.

Okafor: Let's begin with the phrase in our title. Ines, what exactly is 'the hard problem'? Valera: The term was coined by the philosopher David Chalmers in the mid-1990s. He drew a distinction between what he called the 'easy' problems of consciousness and the hard one. The easy problems, and he was being tongue-in-cheek, because they are fiendishly difficult, concern how the brain does things: how it discriminates between colours, focuses attention, stores memories, produces speech. In principle, we know what an answer to those would look like: a description of mechanisms. The hard problem is why any of that processing is accompanied by experience at all. Why is there something it is like to see red, or to taste coffee, rather than nothing?

Okafor: Tom, as a neuroscientist, do you accept that distinction? Haverford: I accept that it's a useful way of framing our bewilderment. What I'm less sure of is that it marks a permanent chasm. In the nineteenth century, many people found it equally baffling that mere chemistry could produce life. There seemed to be some extra ingredient, a 'vital spark'. Nobody found the spark; instead, we explained the functions, such as metabolism, reproduction and growth, and the mystery quietly evaporated. I suspect consciousness may go the same way.

Valera: That's the analogy I hear most often, and I think it's seductive but misleading. With life, once you'd explained all the functions, there was nothing left over to explain. With consciousness, you could, in principle, explain every function and still face the question of why it feels like anything. Philosophers dramatise this with the idea of a 'zombie': not the film variety, I hasten to add, but a being physically identical to you, behaving exactly as you do, with no inner experience whatsoever. If such a being is even conceivable, then the functions alone don't seem to entail experience.

Haverford: Conceivable to whom, though? I can conceive of water that isn't H2O, but that's a fact about my imagination, not about water. Our intuitions were shaped for finding food and avoiding predators, not for judging the limits of neuroscience. I'm wary of letting a thought experiment tell the laboratory what it can't do.

Okafor: Let me bring in another famous example. Thomas Nagel asked, in the 1970s, what it is like to be a bat. Valera: Yes, and his point was subtle. Bats find their way by echolocation. We could, in principle, learn everything about how a bat's brain processes those echoes, and still not know what it is like, from the inside, to perceive the world that way. Objective description seems to leave out the subjective point of view, which is, after all, the very thing we were trying to explain.

Haverford: And yet look at the progress. We can now identify patterns of brain activity that reliably distinguish whether a person has consciously seen an image or not. Some patients who appear entirely unresponsive have been shown, through brain scanning, to follow instructions in their heads. That's not a solution to the hard problem, I grant you, but it is a genuine science of consciousness, and it has real consequences for medicine. Valera: I wouldn't dream of belittling it. My worry is simply that we shouldn't mistake finding the correlates of experience for explaining experience itself. A map of where the lights come on is not an account of why there is light.

Okafor: We have a few minutes left. Is there any common ground? Haverford: More than our sparring suggests. We both think consciousness is real, and I'm not one of those who says it's an illusion. We also both think it's the most remarkable thing in nature. Valera: And we'd both be delighted to be proved wrong, provided it was done elegantly. Perhaps the honest position is that we don't yet know whether the hard problem is hard because of the world or because of the way we've posed the question. Okafor: On that note of constructive uncertainty, thank you both.

Words in colour are explained in the glossary below.

Glossary

WordMeaning
tongue-in-cheek/ˌtʌŋ ɪn ˈtʃiːk/said as a light joke, not meant completely seriously
fiendishly/ˈfiːndɪʃli/extremely (used about something difficult or clever)
discriminates/dɪˈskrɪmɪneɪts/notices or tells the difference between things
bewilderment/bɪˈwɪldəmənt/a feeling of being very confused
chasm/ˈkæzəm/a very deep gap; here, a difference that may never be closed
vital spark/ˌvaɪtəl ˈspɑːk/an old idea of a special force that makes things alive
evaporated/ɪˈvæpəreɪtɪd/slowly disappeared, like water drying up
seductive/sɪˈdʌktɪv/attractive and tempting to believe
hasten to add/ˌheɪsn tu ˈæd/quickly say something extra so that people do not misunderstand
entail/ɪnˈteɪl/to make something necessary; to involve it as a result
intuitions/ˌɪntjuˈɪʃnz/feelings or beliefs we have without careful reasoning
echolocation/ˌekəʊləʊˈkeɪʃən/finding objects by making sounds and listening to the echoes
belittling/bɪˈlɪtlɪŋ/making something seem small or unimportant
correlates/ˈkɒrəleɪts/things that happen together with something else and are linked to it
sparring/ˈspɑːrɪŋ/friendly arguing, like a practice fight
constructive/kənˈstrʌktɪv/useful and helpful, leading to progress

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